Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: Experimental evidence

Poulsen, Odile and Saral, Krista J. (2018) Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: Experimental evidence. Economics Letters, 164. pp. 75-78. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

Are people better at coordinating on a focal point when the game is framed as coordinating on a division of losses rather than gains? In an experimental coordination game, we vary the payoff framing (gain vs loss) and stake size (low vs high) to examine this question. We find that loss framing reduces coordination on the focal point, with the strongest effect observed in high stakes games.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: coordination games,focal point,framing,losses versus gains
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2018 11:30
Last Modified: 18 Mar 2020 00:49
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66018
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.006

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