Andow, James (2017) Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies. Philosophia, 45 (3). pp. 987-993. ISSN 0048-3893
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Abstract
Direct Epistemic Consequentialism faces the Truth Fairy. Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism promises to avoid this issue. But there are worse fairies than the Truth Fairy. There is the Worse Fairy. The case of the Worse Fairy helps demonstrate that epistemic consequentialists who would solve problems like the Truth Fairy by ‘going indirect’ face a dilemma.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | epistemic consequentialism,rationality,truth fairy,worse fairy |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy |
Related URLs: | |
Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2018 16:30 |
Last Modified: | 22 Mar 2024 01:19 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66010 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0 |
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