Penczynski, Stefan P. (2016) Strategic thinking: The influence of the game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 128. pp. 72-84. ISSN 0167-2681

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Abstract

In order to assess the extent to which features of a game affect the strategic sophistication of the people involved, this study investigates the relevance of differing objectives (matching/mismatching) and of virtually moving first or second in the “hide and seek” game. In three different treatments, mismatchers and matchers are not found to exhibit significantly different levels of reasoning although level averages and winning probabilities always are in favor of the matchers. Varying the virtual timing of the game has a significant impact on the shape of the level distribution. The analysis relies on intrateam communication, whose coding is shown to be stable and replicable.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	level of reasoning,task dependence,virtual observability
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	19 Dec 2017 06:07
Last Modified:	28 Jul 2021 00:22
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/65751
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.006

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