A comparison of the wholesale model and the agency model in differentiated markets

Lu, Liang (2017) A comparison of the wholesale model and the agency model in differentiated markets. Review of Industrial Organization, 51 (2). 151–172. ISSN 0889-938X

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Abstract

We compare the wholesale model and the agency model that characterise a vertical relation in a bilateral duopoly framework. Results suggest that the agency model may be regarded as an example of retailer power resale price maintenance and provide an economic view of why restraints of this kind should be evaluated under the rule of reason. While competition is more likely to be undercut under the agency model, relative to the wholesale model, the agency model benefits consumers by offering relatively lower retail prices and greater demand.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	agency model,competition,resale price maintenance,retailer power,vertical restraints
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Related URLs:	http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	08 Aug 2017 05:06
Last Modified:	20 Apr 2023 00:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/64366
DOI:	10.1007/s11151-017-9583-y

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