Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Luhan, Wolfgang, Poulsen, Anders and Roos, Michael (2017) Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 102. 687–699. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2017 01:41
Last Modified: 25 Jun 2020 00:09
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/62950
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016

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