Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

Kocher, Martin G., Poulsen, Odile and Zizzo, Daniel J. (2017) Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining. Social Choice and Welfare, 48 (3). 659–678. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

We experimentally test preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether only union members determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, but it increases if the game becomes an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: social preferences,wage bargaining,accountability,collective decision making
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2017 00:07
Last Modified: 22 May 2020 23:52
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/62055
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1028-x

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