Competition and the use of foggy pricing

Miravete, Eugenio J. (2013) Competition and the use of foggy pricing. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (1). pp. 194-216. ISSN 1945-7669

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Firms engage in foggy pricing when the menu of tariff options aims at profiting from consumer mistakes. The analysis of this paper concludes that the transition from monopoly to competition in the early U.S. cellular telephone industry does not foster the use of such deceptive strategies. I offer three possible measures to account for the fogginess of the menu of options offered by cellular carriers. All results are robust to the existence of uncertainty regarding future consumption at the time of choosing a particular tariff option, as well as to consumers' heterogeneity with respect to cellular telephone usage.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2017 00:06
Last Modified: 12 May 2023 00:28
DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.194

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