Co-Financing Agreements and Reciprocity: When 'No Deal' is a Good Deal

Jang, Dooseok, Patel, Amrish and Dufwenberg, Martin (2016) Co-Financing Agreements and Reciprocity: When 'No Deal' is a Good Deal.

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Abstract

Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal investment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate that indeed they can, but not in the way one might expect. If maximal investment is impossible in the absence of the institution and public good returns are high, then an agreement signed by all parties cannot lead to full investment. However, if all parties reject the co-financing agreement, then an informal deal to invest can lead to full investment. Agreement institutions may thus do more than just facilitate the signing of formal agreements; they may play a critical role in igniting informal cooperation underpinned by reciprocity.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Related URLs:	https://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/953219/1...
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	14 Nov 2016 15:00
Last Modified:	24 May 2023 05:38
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/61325
DOI:

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