Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms

Patel, Amrish and Cartwright, Edward (2012) Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, 168 (2). pp. 280-289. ISSN 0932-4569

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In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 24 Sep 2016 00:13
Last Modified: 22 Oct 2022 01:23
DOI: 10.1628/093245612800933942

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