The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-pay Auction

Modak Chowdhury, Subhasish, Lee, Dongryul and Topolyan, Iryna (2016) The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-pay Auction. Southern Economic Journal, 83 (1). pp. 105-125. ISSN 0038-4038

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Abstract

We investigate a group all-pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group-specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi-pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: c72,d70,d72,41
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2016 09:16
Last Modified: 03 Nov 2020 00:44
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57682
DOI: 10.1002/soej.12129

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