The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Beraldo, Sergio and Sugden, Robert (2016) The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation. Theory and Decision, 80 (4). 501–521. ISSN 0040-5833

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We offer a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and evolution selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. Dynamic properties of the model are investigated theoretically and through simulations based on replicator dynamics.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The final publication is available at Springer via
Uncontrolled Keywords: cooperation,voluntary participation,random payoffs
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2016 09:08
Last Modified: 21 Oct 2022 01:05
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9514-z

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