Vertical agreements between suppliers and retailers that specify a relative price relationship between competing products or competing retailers

Hviid, Morten (2015) Vertical agreements between suppliers and retailers that specify a relative price relationship between competing products or competing retailers. OECD.

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Abstract

This report summarises the economic theory and case law as it relates to recent cases involving vertical agreements specifying horizontal price links. We first identify two classes of vertical restraints with horizontal effects, by reviewing existing case law, and show that they can be analysed using the same logic. We demonstrate that the horizontal link, although commonly referred to as a most favoured nation guarantee, is actually more akin to a price matching guarantee. Building on this, we review the main insight from the well-established literature on price guarantees to demonstrate that there was good reason for competition authorities to scrutinise recent on-line market cases. We then summarise the main insights from the very recent academic economics literature which, based on case law, has focused directly on vertical agreements specifying horizontal price links. The report concludes with recommendations arising from our existing insights and points to areas where more research is needed.

Item Type: Book
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2016 13:01
Last Modified: 11 Jul 2020 23:34
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/56676
DOI:

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