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ToolsHviid, Morten (2015) Vertical agreements between suppliers and retailers that specify a relative price relationship between competing products or competing retailers. OECD.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
This report summarises the economic theory and case law as it relates to recent cases involving vertical agreements specifying horizontal price links. We first identify two classes of vertical restraints with horizontal effects, by reviewing existing case law, and show that they can be analysed using the same logic. We demonstrate that the horizontal link, although commonly referred to as a most favoured nation guarantee, is actually more akin to a price matching guarantee. Building on this, we review the main insight from the well-established literature on price guarantees to demonstrate that there was good reason for competition authorities to scrutinise recent on-line market cases. We then summarise the main insights from the very recent academic economics literature which, based on case law, has focused directly on vertical agreements specifying horizontal price links. The report concludes with recommendations arising from our existing insights and points to areas where more research is needed.
| Item Type: | Book |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Competition, Markets and Regulation Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences > Research Centres > Business and Local Government Data Research Centre (former - to 2023) Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Media, Information Technology and Intellectual Property Law Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Jan 2016 13:01 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Jun 2023 15:04 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/56676 |
| DOI: |
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