The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations:Experimental evidence
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Bett, Zoë, Poulsen, Anders and Poulsen, Odile (2016) The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations:Experimental evidence. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 60. pp. 29-34. ISSN 2214-8043
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Abstract
We experimentally investigate if subjects in a tacit coordination situation with a conflict of interest tend to choose an equal compromise, even if it is strictly dominated. The data show that this is the case, as long as the compromise payoffs are not too low. Game comparisons suggest that choosing a dominated compromise is a focal point that allows subjects to avoid a costly coordination failure.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | coordination,equality,efficiency,focal point,level-k model,inequity aversion |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 15 Jan 2016 10:00 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2020 00:43 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/56330 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.socec.2015.11.004 |
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