Modelling the effect of individual differences in punishment sensitivity on behaviour in a public goods game

Vu, Tuong Manh, Siebers, Peer-Olaf, Skatova, Anya and Turocy, Theodore ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-844X (2015) Modelling the effect of individual differences in punishment sensitivity on behaviour in a public goods game. In: 14th International Conference on Modeling and Applied Simulation, 2015-09-21 - 2015-09-23.

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Abstract

Previous research on social dilemmas demonstrated that various forms of punishment for free-riding can increase contribution levels in public goods games. The way individual group members react to the possibility of punishment can be also affected by individual differences in punishment sensitivity. Therefore, depending individual differences in punishment sensitivity of group members, different levels of punishment can be more or less effective to prevent free riding behaviour. This paper uses agent-based modelling to model the effect of punishment sensitivity on contribution levels in a public goods game. The paper then examines the correlation between punishment sensitivity and variability of free riding behaviour under different punishment conditions.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: agent-based modelling and simulation,behavioural game theory, public goods game,punishment
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Experimental Economics (former - to 2017)
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
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Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 06 Jan 2016 12:04
Last Modified: 14 Jun 2023 11:53
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/56072
DOI:

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