Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

Polanski, Arnold (2016) Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks. Social Choice and Welfare, 46 (4). pp. 767-776. ISSN 0176-1714

Preview

PDF (SCWE DOI 10.1007s00355-015-0935-y) - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (587kB) | Preview

Abstract

We examine the relationship between the matching structure of a bipartite (buyer-seller) network and the (expected) shares of the unit surplus that each connected pair in this network can create. We show that in different bargaining environments, these shares are closely related to the Gallai-Edmonds Structure Theorem. This theorem characterizes the structure of maximum matchings in an undirected graph. We show that the relationship between the (expected) shares and the tructure Theorem is not an artefact of a particular bargaining mechanism or trade centralization. However, this relationship does not necessarily generalize to non-bipartite networks or to networks with heterogeneous link values.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Uncontrolled Keywords:	buyer-seller networks,gallai-edmonds structure theorem,bargaining,matching
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance Faculty of Science > Research Groups > Statistics
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2015 07:29
Last Modified:	28 Mar 2025 06:52
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/55540
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-015-0935-y

Downloads

Actions (login required)

View Item