Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

Polanski, Arnold ORCID: (2016) Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks. Social Choice and Welfare, 46 (4). pp. 767-776. ISSN 0176-1714

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We examine the relationship between the matching structure of a bipartite (buyer-seller) network and the (expected) shares of the unit surplus that each connected pair in this network can create. We show that in different bargaining environments, these shares are closely related to the Gallai-Edmonds Structure Theorem. This theorem characterizes the structure of maximum matchings in an undirected graph. We show that the relationship between the (expected) shares and the tructure Theorem is not an artefact of a particular bargaining mechanism or trade centralization. However, this relationship does not necessarily generalize to non-bipartite networks or to networks with heterogeneous link values.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at
Uncontrolled Keywords: buyer-seller networks,gallai-edmonds structure theorem,bargaining,matching
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 01 Dec 2015 07:29
Last Modified: 29 Jan 2023 06:30
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0935-y


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