Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence

Parravano, Melanie and Poulsen, Odile (2015) Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 94. 191–199. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-kmodel used by Crawford et al.(2008). These findings suggest that players’ mode of reasoning, and the extent to which it can be explained by team reasoning or a level-kmodel, crucially depends on the symmetry or asymmetry of the coordination payoffs.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: coordination,stake size,payoff asymmetry,labels,focal point
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences > Norwich Medical School
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 05 Aug 2015 09:24
Last Modified: 22 Jul 2020 00:20
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/54023
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001

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