Excludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production

Croson, Rachel, Fatas, Enrique, Neugebauer, Tibor and Morales, Antonio J. (2015) Excludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 114. 13–26.

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Exclusion has long been employed as a common disciplinary measure against defectors, both at work and in social life. In this paper, we study the effect of excludability - exclusion of the lowest contributor - on contributions in three different team production settings. We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that excludability increases contributions. Excludability is particularly effective in production settings where the average or maximum effort determines team production. In these settings, we observe almost immediate convergence to full contribution. In settings where the minimum effort determines team production, excludability leads to a large increase in contributions only if the value of the excluded individual's contribution to the public good is redistributed among the included individuals.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This article is available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). You may copy and distribute the article, create extracts, abstracts and new works from the article, alter and revise the article, text or data mine the article and otherwise reuse the article commercially (including reuse and/or resale of the article) without permission from Elsevier. You must give appropriate credit to the original work, together with a link to the formal publication through the relevant DOI and a link to the Creative Commons user license above. You must indicate if any changes are made but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use of the work.
Uncontrolled Keywords: best-shot mechanism,competition,cooperation,exclusion,linear public goods games,weakest-link mechanism,organizational behavior and human resource management,economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1400/1407
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
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Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 24 Jul 2015 21:56
Last Modified: 21 Oct 2022 00:41
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/53545
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.005


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