Public goods and decay in networks

Fatas, Enrique, Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., Morales, Antonio J. and Solaz, Hector (2015) Public goods and decay in networks. SERIEs, 6 (1). pp. 73-90. ISSN 1869-4195

[thumbnail of art%3A10.1007%2Fs13209-014-0114-x-1]
PDF (art%3A10.1007%2Fs13209-014-0114-x-1) - Published Version
Download (972kB) | Preview


We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Available under Open Access
Uncontrolled Keywords: decay,networks,public good
Faculty \ School:
Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 10 Oct 2014 11:32
Last Modified: 21 Oct 2022 00:12
DOI: 10.1007/s13209-014-0114-x


Downloads per month over past year

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item