Strategically Equivalent Contests

Modak Chowdhury, Subhasish and Sheremeta, Roman M (2015) Strategically Equivalent Contests. Theory and Decision, 78 (4). pp. 587-601. ISSN 0040-5833

[img]
Preview
PDF (Equivalent_Contests) - Submitted Version
Download (116kB) | Preview

Abstract

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Available under Open Access
Uncontrolled Keywords: rent-seeking,contest,equivalence,contest design
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2014 14:00
Last Modified: 22 Jul 2020 00:01
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/50477
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9440-5

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item