Is The Korean Innovation of Individual Informant Rewards a Viable Cartel Detection Tool

Stephan, Andreas ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9839-7338 (2014) Is The Korean Innovation of Individual Informant Rewards a Viable Cartel Detection Tool. In: Cartels in Asia. Kluwer International.

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Abstract

This chapter considers whether the use of individual informant rewards or bounties is a viable cartel detection tool. Rewards have the potential to enhance enforcement by revealing infringements that would otherwise go undetected. In order to be effective they should be made available to individuals directly involved in cartels because they may be the only viable source of information. Mere protection from retaliatory measures of employers does not create an adequate incentive to report misbehaviour. The personal costs and risks associated with whistleblowing are so significant that effective rewards may need to amount to a lottery win in order for reporting to be worthwhile. Reward systems pose some dangers to the enforcement system, but these can be managed.

Item Type:	Book Section
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Competition, Markets and Regulation Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	25 Mar 2014 14:56
Last Modified:	20 Jun 2023 14:57
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/47944
DOI:

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