Two-sided coalitional matchings

Dimitrov, Dinko and Lazarova, Emiliya ORCID: (2011) Two-sided coalitional matchings. Mathematical Social Sciences, 62 (1). pp. 46-54. ISSN 0165-4896

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In a two-sided coalitional matching problem agents on each side of the market simultaneously form coalitions which then are matched to coalitions from the other market side. We assume that each agent has preferences over groups on his own market side and over groups on the opposite market side. These preferences are combined lexicographically as to examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied Econometrics And Finance
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 03 Mar 2014 12:32
Last Modified: 24 Oct 2022 06:04

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