Step thinking and costly coordination

Fatas, E. and Morales, A.J. (2013) Step thinking and costly coordination. Economics Letters, 120 (2). pp. 181-183. ISSN 0165-1765

Full text not available from this repository.


Using the experimental sessions of Goeree and Holt (2005), we show that step thinking fits the long-run outcome of minimum-effort and median-effort games surprisingly well for all values of the cost parameter. In the latter, the predicted discontinuous behaviour of step thinking accommodates the bimodal pattern observed for the intermediate values of the cost parameter quite well.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: experiments,step thinking,coordination games
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2013 14:16
Last Modified: 24 Oct 2022 05:02
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.032

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item