Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies

Sokol, Daniel D. and Stephan, Andreas (2013) Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies. In: Competition Law and Development. Stanford University Press. ISBN 9780804785716

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

This chapter identifies how developing world competition agencies can best prioritize cartel enforcement. Each jurisdiction will face a slightly different set of issues depending on its specific level of development and its socio-economic, legal and institutional endowments. Nevertheless, there are four key challenges facing most economies in transition: (1) an inability to challenge international cartels, which are potentially very damaging to developing economies; (2) obstacles to effective domestic enforcement, including the successful introduction of leniency, the imposition of penalties and the creation of competition and compliance cultures; (3) the danger of firms in concentrated markets colluding tacitly, so as to put their activities out of reach of anti-cartel enforcement and (4) collusion in public procurement, which may be particularly widespread.

Item Type: Book Section
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Depositing User: Andreas Stephan
Date Deposited: 20 Feb 2013 09:21
Last Modified: 22 Apr 2020 09:44
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/41392
DOI: 10.11126/stanford/9780804785716.003.0009

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item