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Sokol, Daniel D. and Stephan, Andreas 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9839-7338
(2013)
Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies.
In:
Competition Law and Development.
Stanford University Press.
ISBN 9780804785716
Abstract
This chapter identifies how developing world competition agencies can best prioritize cartel enforcement. Each jurisdiction will face a slightly different set of issues depending on its specific level of development and its socio-economic, legal and institutional endowments. Nevertheless, there are four key challenges facing most economies in transition: (1) an inability to challenge international cartels, which are potentially very damaging to developing economies; (2) obstacles to effective domestic enforcement, including the successful introduction of leniency, the imposition of penalties and the creation of competition and compliance cultures; (3) the danger of firms in concentrated markets colluding tacitly, so as to put their activities out of reach of anti-cartel enforcement and (4) collusion in public procurement, which may be particularly widespread.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Competition, Markets and Regulation Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy |
| Depositing User: | Andreas Stephan |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Feb 2013 09:21 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Jun 2023 14:51 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/41392 |
| DOI: | 10.11126/stanford/9780804785716.003.0009 |
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