Conditional cooperation in two public goods games: the weakest link and the VCM

Croson, R., Fatas, Enrique and Neugebauer, T. (2005) Conditional cooperation in two public goods games: the weakest link and the VCM. Economics Letters, 87 (1). pp. 95-101.

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Abstract

Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 16 Jan 2013 15:55
Last Modified: 10 Jul 2020 23:42
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/40799
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

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