The impossibility of unbiased judgement aggregation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2010) The impossibility of unbiased judgement aggregation. Theory and Decision, 68. pp. 281-299.

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Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. When applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is effectively dictatorial.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 09 Feb 2012 16:10
Last Modified: 16 Aug 2023 16:30
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-009-9186-7

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