Majority voting on restricted domains

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2010) Majority voting on restricted domains. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2). pp. 512-543.

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Abstract

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen's triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results support the robustness of majority rule.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julie Frith
Date Deposited:	09 Feb 2012 16:09
Last Modified:	06 Sep 2023 14:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/36998
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.003

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