Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games

Guillen, Pablo, Fatas, Enrique and Brañas-Garza, Pablo (2010) Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (6). pp. 872-883.

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Abstract

This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Katherine Humphries
Date Deposited:	09 Feb 2012 15:23
Last Modified:	15 Jun 2023 15:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/36983
DOI:	10.1016/j.joep.2010.07.002

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