Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies

Hanretty, Chris and Koop, Christel (2012) Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies. Journal of European Public Policy, 19 (2). pp. 198-216. ISSN 1466-4429

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Abstract

While the literature on delegation has discussed at length the benefits of creating independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), not much attention has been paid to the conceptualization and operationalization of agency independence. In this study, we argue that existing attempts to operationalize the formal political independence of IRAs suffer from a number of conceptual and methodological flaws. To address these, we define what we understand by independence, and in particular formal independence from politics. Using new data gathered from 175 IRAs world- wide, we model formal independence as a latent trait. We find that some items commonly used to measure independence – notably, the method used to appoint agency executives and the scope of the agency’s competences – are unrelated to formal independence. We close by showing that our revised measure partially changes conclusions about the determinants and consequences of formal independence

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Political, Social and International Studies (former - to 2014)
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Media@uea (former - to 2017) Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Political, Social and International Studies Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Policy & Politics
Depositing User:	Chris Hanretty
Date Deposited:	14 Sep 2011 08:47
Last Modified:	21 Jul 2023 09:20
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/34703
DOI:	10.1080/13501763.2011.607357

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