Mixed ownership, managerial incentives and bank competition

Saha, Bibhas and Sensarma, Rudra (2010) Mixed ownership, managerial incentives and bank competition. Bulletin of Economic Research, 63 (4). pp. 385-403. ISSN 1467-8586

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Abstract

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit-linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit-linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Julia Sheldrake
Date Deposited:	20 Apr 2011 10:12
Last Modified:	28 Mar 2025 03:09
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29675
DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00354.x

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