On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role allocation procedures in evolutionary bargaining

Poulsen, Anders U. (2004) On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role allocation procedures in evolutionary bargaining. Mathematical Social Sciences, 47 (2). pp. 233-243.

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Abstract

We show, in the context of a simple evolutionary bargaining game, that the efficiency of bargaining behavior depends crucially on the tie-breaking rule players use. For certain tie-breaking rules, and in the limit as the number of feasible demands becomes infinite, all the surplus is wasted. Inefficiency arises for any role assignment procedure, as long as there is some probability that two players are assigned to the same role. We also investigate the relationship between bargaining efficiency and spitefulness.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Depositing User:	Julia Sheldrake
Date Deposited:	19 Apr 2011 08:02
Last Modified:	28 Mar 2025 04:27
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/29575
DOI:	10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.003

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