Nonlinear supply contracts, exclusive dealing, and equilibrium market foreclosure

O'Brien, Daniel P. and Shaffer, Greg (1997) Nonlinear supply contracts, exclusive dealing, and equilibrium market foreclosure. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6 (4). pp. 755-785. ISSN 1530-9134

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Abstract

We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer's perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Pareto-dominated equilibria are unlikely to arise, then the difference between our results and those of Mathewson and Winter (1987), who do not allow for nonlinear pricing, suggests an ironic twist on the notion that quantity discounts and other kinds of nonlinear pricing can provide an additional way for a manufacturer to foreclose a rival. By providing a manufacturer with increased flexibility (beyond linear pricing) to extract a retailer's surplus, nonlinear pricing may instead have the effect of reducing the incidence of observed market foreclosure.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Depositing User:	Nicola Secker
Date Deposited:	01 Apr 2011 15:39
Last Modified:	27 Oct 2023 00:52
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/27866
DOI:

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