Bundling and menus of two-part tariffs

Kolay, Sreya and Shaffer, Greg (2003) Bundling and menus of two-part tariffs. Journal of Industrial Economics, 51 (3). pp. 383-403. ISSN 1467-6451

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Abstract

Inducing self-selection among different segments of consumers is an important issue in pricing. Some firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of two-part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans) and letting consumers select the tariff and quantity they prefer. Other firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of price-quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) and letting consumers select only from among these bundles. We show that bundling is more profitable absent cost considerations. Social welfare may be higher or lower with bundling.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Depositing User:	Nicola Secker
Date Deposited:	01 Apr 2011 07:59
Last Modified:	08 Mar 2023 12:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/27829
DOI:	10.1111/1467-6451.00206

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