The political economy of cross-scale networks in resource co-management

Adger, W. Neil, Brown, Katrina and Tompkins, Emma L. (2005) The political economy of cross-scale networks in resource co-management. Ecology and Society, 10 (2). pp. 9-22.

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Abstract

We investigate linkages between stakeholders in resource management that occur at different spatial and institutional levels and identify the winners and losers in such interactions. So-called cross-scale interactions emerge because of the benefits to individual stakeholder groups in undertaking them or the high costs of not undertaking them. Hence there are uneven gains from cross-scale interactions that are themselves an integral part of social-ecological system governance. The political economy framework outlined here suggests that the determinants of the emergence of cross-scale interactions are the exercise of relative power between stakeholders and their costs of accessing and creating linkages. Cross-scale interactions by powerful stakeholders have the potential to undermine trust in resource management arrangements. If government regulators, for example, mobilize information and resources from cross-level interactions to reinforce their authority, this often disempowers other stakeholders such as resource users. Offsetting such impacts, some cross-scale interactions can be empowering for local level user groups in creating social and political capital. These issues are illustrated with observations on resource management in a marine protected area in Tobago in the Caribbean. The case study demonstrates that the structure of the cross-scale interplay, in terms of relative winners and losers, determines its contribution to the resilience of social-ecological systems.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Science > School of Environmental Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Global Development (formerly School of International Development)
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Depositing User: Rosie Cullington
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2011 08:18
Last Modified: 08 Aug 2023 14:30
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/27529
DOI:

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