Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism

Collins, John (2000) Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology, 13 (4). pp. 465-90. ISSN 0951-5089

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I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. I show that, while my ensemble account of ToM and language refutes the culturalist presuppositions that tend to underlie eliminativist arguments, the falsity of folk psychology is consistent with the account.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Depositing User: Philip Robinson
Date Deposited: 18 Mar 2011 15:08
Last Modified: 01 Nov 2023 01:39
DOI: 10.1080/09515080020007616

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