Collins, John (2000) Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology, 13 (4). pp. 465-90. ISSN 0951-5089
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. I show that, while my ensemble account of ToM and language refutes the culturalist presuppositions that tend to underlie eliminativist arguments, the falsity of folk psychology is consistent with the account.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies (former - to 2024) |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy |
| Depositing User: | Philip Robinson |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Mar 2011 15:08 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Oct 2025 07:32 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/26695 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09515080020007616 |
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