Multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly

Dobson, Paul W. (1994) Multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly. European Economic Review, 38 (1). pp. 87-100.

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Abstract

This paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry-wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining, that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner, to simultaneous bargaining with the firms. The paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric. The analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position (i.e. impatient to settle) or a firm with relatively large profits.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Responsible Business Regulation Group Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	Nicola Secker
Date Deposited:	30 Mar 2011 16:20
Last Modified:	06 Jun 2023 11:59
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/26135
DOI:	10.1016/0014-2921(94)90007-8

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