The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly

Dobson, Paul ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7352-740X and Waterson, Michael (2007) The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25 (5). pp. 935-962. ISSN 0167-7187

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

This paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry-wide resale price maintenance (RPM) arrangements, such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against RPM. A bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services. Transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining. We do not find RPM to be universally undesirable. However where retailer power is strong, the social effects of RPM are likely to be adverse, since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Responsible Business Regulation Group Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	Amanda Holland
Date Deposited:	11 Mar 2011 14:37
Last Modified:	03 May 2024 14:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/25983
DOI:	10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.004

Actions (login required)

View Item