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ToolsMcQuillin, Ben and Sugden, Robert (2011) The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form. Social Choice and Welfare, 37 (4). pp. 683-706. ISSN 0176-1714
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
We propose a new type of cooperative game—a game in transition function (TF) form—as a means of representing social decision-making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells us (where the EF form does not) about the alienability of a right. We describe procedures for generating a (unique) EF game from a TF game, and for generating a (non-unique) TF game from an EF game. We make some specific proposals about the representation of rights as properties of TF games and comment on some implications about the relationship between rights and Pareto efficiency.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy |
| Depositing User: | Gina Neff |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2011 15:53 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Apr 2023 23:54 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19361 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-011-0574-x |
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