Computing sequential equilibria using agent quantal response equilibria

Turocy, Theodore L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-844X (2010) Computing sequential equilibria using agent quantal response equilibria. Economic Theory, 42 (1). pp. 255-269.

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Abstract

The limit of any convergent sequence of agent quantal response equilibria is a sequential equilibrium of an extensive game. Using a logarithmic transformation of action probabilities, it is numerically feasible and practical to compute such sequences, and thereby compute good approximations to sequential equilibrium assessments. This paper describes the algorithm to compute the sequences, and outlines the convergence and selection properties of the method.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Experimental Economics (former - to 2017)
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User: Gina Neff
Date Deposited: 17 Jan 2011 11:19
Last Modified: 14 Aug 2023 11:30
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/19294
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0443-3

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