Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: An experimental study

Poulsen, Anders U. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1742-2595 and Tan, Jonathan H. W. (2007) Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: An experimental study. Experimental Economics, 10 (4). pp. 391-409. ISSN 1573-6938

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

We experimentally investigate if free information disadvantages a player relative to when information is unavailable. We study an Ultimatum game where the Proposer, before making an offer, can obtain free information about the Responder's minimum acceptable offer. Theoretically, the Proposer should obtain the information and play a best reply to the Responder's minimum acceptable offer. Thus the Responder should get the largest share of the surplus. We find that an increasing number of Proposers become informed over time. Moreover, the proportion of Proposers who use the information to maximize money earnings increases over time. The majority of information-acquiring Proposers, however, refuse to offer more than one-half and play a best reply only to Responders who accept offers of one-half or less. This, together with a substantial proportion of Proposers who choose to remain uninformed, means that the availability of free information backfires for Proposers only by a little.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	mid:11690 dc:ueastatus:post-print formatted dc:ueahesastaffidentifier:0511176308222
Uncontrolled Keywords:	information acquisition,ultimatum game,fairness,inequity aversion
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Depositing User:	Vishal Gautam
Date Deposited:	09 Dec 2010 18:02
Last Modified:	22 Apr 2023 01:20
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/16367
DOI:	10.1007/s10683-006-9143-z

Actions (login required)

View Item