The Experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions

Bardsley, Nicholas and Moffatt, Peter G. (2007) The Experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions. Theory and Decision, 62 (2). pp. 161-193. ISSN 0040-5833

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In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: mid:11698 dc:ueastatus:post-print formatted dc:ueahesastaffidentifier:0000895016355
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Vishal Gautam
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2010 18:02
Last Modified: 22 Apr 2023 01:19
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3

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