Prisoner's dilemma payoffs and the evolution of co-operative preferences

Poulsen, Anders ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1742-2595 and Poulsen, Odile (2010) Prisoner's dilemma payoffs and the evolution of co-operative preferences. Journal of Socio-Economics, 39 (2). pp. 158-162.

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Abstract

We analyse the evolutionary stability of a preference for reciprocity in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. A distingushing and, as we argue, plausible, feature of the analysis is that reciprocal players are not assumed to be able to coordinate on mutual cooperation with probability one. We show how two payoff conditions, one well-known and another new, then become crucial for the evolutionary stability of co-operation. Somewhat paradoxically perhaps, an altruistic preference poses a greater threat to stable cooperation than a self-interested preference.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Environment, Resources and Conflict
Depositing User: Gina Neff
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2010 16:02
Last Modified: 04 Jan 2024 01:54
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10851
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2009.10.002

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