Stephan, Andreas ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9839-7338 (2009) The direct settlement of EC Cartel cases. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 58 (3). pp. 627-654. ISSN 0020-5893
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
In June 2008 the European Commission adopted a system of direct settlement for cartel cases, inspired by a comparative glance across the Atlantic where the majority of antitrust defendants enter negotiated guilty pleas. Whereas settlements in Europe are viewed as a method for expediting the conclusion of cases (distinct from the leniency notice), in the US they complement the offer of immunity as a device for encouraging cooperation. In both jurisdictions they have the effect of reducing the levels of fines imposed. This paper compares how well the two systems fare at enhancing administrative efficiency and deterrence, while maintaining transparency.
Item Type: | Article |
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Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Competition, Markets and Regulation Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy |
Depositing User: | Julia Sheldrake |
Date Deposited: | 12 Nov 2010 10:04 |
Last Modified: | 22 Apr 2023 00:52 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10830 |
DOI: | 10.1017/S0020589309001237 |
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