Acquisition and dissemination of information in imperfectly competitive markets

Andersen, Torben M. and Hviid, Morten (1994) Acquisition and dissemination of information in imperfectly competitive markets. Economic Inquiry, 32 (3). pp. 498-510. ISSN 1465-7295

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations. Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices which are either biased or not adjusted to all available information so as to distort their information content. Even when information is costlessly available strategic considerations may lead firms to remain uninformed. These results are illustrated in a simple Stackelberg model with price-setting firms where the pricing game is preceded by an information acquisition game.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Competition, Markets and Regulation Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences > Research Centres > Business and Local Government Data Research Centre (former - to 2023) Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Media, Information Technology and Intellectual Property Law Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User:	Julie Frith
Date Deposited:	16 Nov 2010 09:37
Last Modified:	22 Apr 2023 23:57
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10804
DOI:	10.1111/j.1465-7295.1994.tb01346.x

Actions (login required)

View Item