Economic Governance and Institutional Design

Prüfer, Jens ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7203-9711 (2026) Economic Governance and Institutional Design. Regulation & Governance. ISSN 1748-5983

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Abstract

How should institutions be designed to achieve compliance with behavioral rules, including laws, social norms, religious rules, or cultural traditions? This conceptual paper introduces a typology of economic governance institutions and explains how it can be used both by policy makers, administrators, and researchers in all social sciences to improve rule compliance. It explains how effective and efficient institutions can be identified for a given economic governance problem. The framework is built on the microeconomic foundations of economic governance theory, and its applicability extends to any compliance problem that can be formalized as a social dilemma or coordination game. The concepts are applied to two cases: how to create trust in cloud computing technologies, and how to implement data sharing of user-generated information on data-driven markets.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	das not required, no data associated with output ,/dt/atira/pure/keyword/DAStatement/das_not_required_no_data_associated_with_output
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	27 Oct 2026 15:42
Last Modified:	27 Oct 2026 15:42
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/104885
DOI:	10.1111/rego.70216

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