The limits of conceivability: logical cognitivism and the language faculty

Collins, John (2009) The limits of conceivability: logical cognitivism and the language faculty. Synthese, 171. pp. 175-194. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Robert Hanna (Rationality and logic. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006) articulates and defends the thesis of logical cognitivism, the claim that human logical competence is grounded in a cognitive faculty (in Chomsky’s sense) that is not naturalistically explicable. This position is intended to steer us between the Scylla of logical Platonism and the Charybdis of logical naturalism (/psychologism). The paper argues that Hanna’s interpretation of Chomsky is mistaken. Read aright, Chomsky’s position offers a defensible version of naturalism, one Hanna may accept as far as his version of naturalism goes, although not one that supports the claim that cognitive science offers a place for logic that is somehow outside the natural, contingent order.

Item Type:	Article
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Philosophy (former - to 2014)
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Depositing User:	EPrints Services
Date Deposited:	01 Oct 2010 13:58
Last Modified:	10 Aug 2023 14:30
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10195
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-008-9391-x

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