Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: Experimental evidence

Poulsen, Odile and Saral, Krista J. (2018) Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: Experimental evidence. Economics Letters, 164. pp. 75-78. ISSN 0165-1765

[img] PDF (Accepted manuscript) - Submitted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 11 January 2020.
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (410kB) | Request a copy

    Abstract

    Are people better at coordinating on a focal point when the game is framed as coordinating on a division of losses rather than gains? In an experimental coordination game, we vary the payoff framing (gain vs loss) and stake size (low vs high) to examine this question. We find that loss framing reduces coordination on the focal point, with the strongest effect observed in high stakes games.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: coordination games,focal point,framing,losses versus gains
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Related URLs:
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2018 11:30
    Last Modified: 09 Apr 2019 12:59
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66018
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.006

    Actions (login required)

    View Item