Strategic thinking: The influence of the game

Penczynski, Stefan P. (2016) Strategic thinking: The influence of the game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 128. pp. 72-84. ISSN 0167-2681

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    Abstract

    In order to assess the extent to which features of a game affect the strategic sophistication of the people involved, this study investigates the relevance of differing objectives (matching/mismatching) and of virtually moving first or second in the “hide and seek” game. In three different treatments, mismatchers and matchers are not found to exhibit significantly different levels of reasoning although level averages and winning probabilities always are in favor of the matchers. Varying the virtual timing of the game has a significant impact on the shape of the level distribution. The analysis relies on intrateam communication, whose coding is shown to be stable and replicable.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: level of reasoning,task dependence,virtual observability
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2017 06:07
    Last Modified: 13 Mar 2019 10:48
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/65751
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.006

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